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Underground Water:
A Fugitive at the Borderl
ADRIENNE PAULE*
"In bringing industrialization to the border, we are also in
the process of creating the longest Love Canal and
Superfund site on planet [Elarth."2
I. Introduction
An astounding ninety-four percent of the Earth's water
lies in its highly saline oceans and seas.3 Only the remaining
six percent is fresh water, and of this, two-thirds is ground-
water.4 If unusable fresh water resources, such as icecaps
and glaciers, are removed from consideration, a full ninety-
five percent of the world's usable fresh water resources is
groundwater. Surface water comprises a mere three and one-
half percent of fresh water resources. 5 Moreover, ground-
1. The term "fugitive" for groundwater was used by Albert E. Utton. See
Albert E. Utton, International Groundwater Management: The Case of the
U.S.-Mexican Frontier, 57 NEB. L. REV. 633, 638 (1978) (quoting Ciriacy &
Wantrup, Concepts Used as Criteria for a System, in ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 251-71 (S. Smith & E. Castle eds.,
1964)).
* The author thanks the PELR staff for its patience, diligence, and effort
while working to elucidate some rather nebulous phrases and concepts.
2. Hector Fuentez, Associate Professor at the University of Texas at El
Paso, quoted in Transboundary Pollution: Joint U.S., Mexican Manufacturing
Program May Be Causing Pollution in Texas, Arizona, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 6, 306, 308 (June 14, 1989) [hereinafter Transboundary Pollution].
3. R. ALLAN FREEZE & JOHN A. CHERRY, GROUNDWATER 5 (1979). One esti-
mate of saltwater as a percentage of the world's water is as high as ninety-
seven percent. Peter H. Gleick, An Introduction to Global Fresh Water Issues,
in WATER IN CRISIS: A GUIDE TO THE WORLD'S FRESH WATER RESOURCES 3 (Pe-
ter H. Gleick ed., 1993). According to this estimate, only 0.3 percent of all fresh-
water is surface water. Id.
4. FREEZE & CHERRY, supra note 3, at 5.
5. Id. An estimated 68.7 percent of freshwater is in the form of ice and
permanent snow cover in the Arctic and Antarctic. Igor A. Shiklomanov, World
1129
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water shares a critical hydrological relationship with surface
water and is therefore essential to the natural geological bal-
ancing of the earth.6 Geological science has revealed that
groundwater operates distinctly from surface water as a non-
renewable resource, 7 and groundwater is only a part of the
subterranean reservoir.8
Because groundwater flows freely across international
boundaries, the integrity of groundwater is an international
concern. 9 When polluted groundwater flows beyond a na-
tion's borders, issues of transboundary liability arise.10 The
potential for international groundwater disputes is especially
acute at the borderlands between the United States and
Mexico."
Fresh Water Resources, in WATER IN CRISIS, supra note 3, at 13. This water is in
the form of lakes, swamps, reservoirs, and river channels. FREEZE & CHERRY,
supra note 3, at 5. The remaining 1.5 percent of usable fresh water consists of
soil moisture. Id.
6. See TIMOTHY R. HENDERSON ET AL., GROUNDWATER: STRATEGIES FOR
STATE ACTION 2-4 (1984).
7. A. DAN TARLoCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 647 (4th ed.
1993).
8. Id. at 484.
9. LUDWIK A. TECLAFF & ALBERT E. UTTON, INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER
LAW 9 (1981).
10. "Transfrontier pollution includes disturbances that originate in one
country, are transmitted through a shared natural resource, and take effect on
another.... ." Stephen C. McCaffrey, Pollution of Shared Natural Resources:
Legal and Trade Implications, in 71 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. OF THE 71ST AN-
NUAL MEETING 56, 56 (James A. R. Nafziger ed., 1977). See also Oscar
Schachter, The Emergence of International Environmental Law, 44 J. INT'L AFF.
457, 464 (1990). To construe an international environmental tort, the harm
(pollution) must result from a "physical consequence of [a] causal human activ-
ity." Id. Furthermore, the physical harm must cross international boundaries
and "must be significant or substantial." Id.
11. See, U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA), PUB. No. __
EPA SUMMARY: ENVT'L PLAN FOR THE MEX:CAN-U.S. BORDER AREA, FIRST STAGE
(1992-1994) 11-12 (1992) [hereinafter EPA SUMMARY]. But see Robert D. Hay-
ton, Institutional Alternatives for Mexico- U.S. Groundwater Management, in IN-
TERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW 135 (1981)("[T]he record of cooperation and
collaboration between these two sovereign states, though not without its more
difficult periods, is an outstanding one.").
Since 1965, rapid industrialization and population growth spurred by the
maquiladora program have burdened the water resources at the border. EPA
SUMMARY, supra, at 8. For an explanation of the maquiladora program, see in-
fra note 267.
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In the past decade, rapid industrialization and develop-
ment at the border has resulted in intense groundwater de-
pletion and pollution. 12 However, neither the United States
nor Mexico has adequate superstructural, statutory, and en-
forcement capabilities to fully combat pollution. 13 Instead,
both nations are subject to a complex maze of statutes, doc-
trines, and enforcement processes that only partially address
international groundwater pollution.14 General water policy
between the nations is directed according to the principles set
forth in several treaties and conventions. 15
Until 1995, the United States and Mexico operated ac-
cording to the Integrated Environmental Border Plan (IEBP).
The IEBP expresses the joint commitment to protect and im-
prove the environmental quality of the borderlands. 16 The
first stage of the IEBP expired on December 31, 1994, and,
since no subsequent stages of the IEBP have been imple-
mented, its binding effect as a joint agreement remains un-
12. See infra part IV.
13. Although both the United States and Mexico address groundwater pol-
lution in various documents, see infra part IV, neither of the countries have a
comprehensive groundwater law. See infra parts Ill, V, and VI.B.
14. See infra part III.'
15. See infra note 16. See also, e.g., Convention on Boundary Waters: Rio
Grande and Rio Colorado, March 1, 1889, U.S.-Mex., 26 Stat. 1512 [hereinafter
Rio Grande Convention]; The 1944 Treaty Relating to the Utilization of the Col-
orado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944 [hereinafter 1944
Treaty], U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219; Permanent and Definitive Solution to the In-
ternational Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River, International Bound-
ary and Water Commission (IBWC) Minute No. 242, August 30, 1973, U.S.-
Mex., 24 U.S.T. 1971, [hereinafter Minute No. 242]; Agreement Between the
United States of America and the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the
Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, Aug. 14,
1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 10,827 [hereinafter La Paz Agreement]. See gen-
erally U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Secretaria de Desar-
rollo Urbano y Ecologia (SEDUE), Integrated Environmental Border Plan For
the Mexico-United States Border Area (1st Stage 1992-1994) [hereinafter
IEBP].
16. IEBP, supra note 15. The IEBP is a proposed draft treaty which ex-
presses the commitment of the United States and Mexico to protect and im-
prove the quality of the environment at the border. Id. The IEBP does not
meet treaty status, and is not binding upon either country under general inter-
national law principles. For a further discussion of the IEBP and international
legal principles, see infra part IV.
3
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clear. 17 As of January 1995, pollution along the border area
between the United States and Mexico has been addressed
most directly by the North American Free Trade Agreement
Draft Environmental Side Accord (NAFTA Environmental
Side Accord).' 8 The Border Environmental Cooperation Com-
mission (BECC) evaluates border infrastructure proposals
that are submitted to the North American Development Bank
(NADBANK).1 9 However, neither these institutions nor the
NAFTA Environmental Side Accord have groundwater pro-
tection as their primary focus. 20
All of the other treaties or agreements between the
United States and Mexico address groundwater protection.
However, not one treaty contains specific measures to pre-
vent future groundwater pollution or provides measures for
remediation of currently polluted aquifers.21 Furthermore,
problems of enforcing existing pollution regulations are more
procedurally and financially difficult now than when the
IEBP was in effect.22
17. Id. According to the EPA and SEDUE, subsequent stages of the IEBP
will be developed according to analyzed needs at the border. Id.
18. See North American Free Trade Agreement Draft Side Accord on Envi-
ronment, Daily Report For Executives, Sept. 13, 1993, available in WESTLAW,
1993 DER 175 at d70 [hereinafter NAFTA Side Accord].
19. Stephen P. Mumme, The North American Commission for Environmen-
tal Cooperation: Towards A Working Agenda For The First Three Years With
Emphasis on the U.S.-Mexico Border Area, Paper Prepared For A Planning
Meeting On Transboundary Issues, North American Commission for Environ-
mental Cooperation 7-9 (Nov. 1994) (on file with author). The Border Environ-
mental Cooperation Commission (BECC), established on January 1, 1994,
operates in conjunction with the International Boundary and Water Commis-
sion (IBWC) in helping to "develop water remediation projects and water man-
agement infrastructure in the border area." Id.
20. Id.
21. Farah Khakee, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Need to
Protect Transboundary Water Resources, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 848, 849 (1992-
1993).
22. ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw 223 (1991). "Unmanaged drilling of groundwater in the El Paso/Cuidad
Juarez area threatens exhaustion of the resource by the year 2000." Id. The
IEBP's Stage One expired on December 31, 1994, and no subsequent stages or
clear line of pollution dispute settlement has been established since. See supra
note 17.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/37
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One solution, proposed by several eminent water and
political science scholars, is to adopt the 1989 Bellagio Draft
Treaty. 28 The acceptance of an updated treaty by the United
States and Mexico would create a regulatory foundation upon
which groundwater could be more adequately protected.
However, absent an accompanying statutory framework
through which to impose penalties or liability and cleanup
procedures, the adoption of this treaty alone may not ade-
quately address the growing pollution problems in the
borderlands.
This comment argues that the recent expiration of the
IEBP, the lack of a bilateral groundwater treaty, and the po-
tential environmental disasters at the Mexican border compel
immediate concern for the preservation of potable ground-
water at the border. Part II of this comment provides a brief
background of groundwater and its importance. Part III ex-
amines the present legal avenues in the United States and
Mexico for groundwater protection. Part IV discusses the im-
pact of international environmental law on groundwater.
Part V reviews the binding bilateral agreements between the
United States and Mexico. Part VI considers the continuing
pollution and enforcement problems at the borderlands. Part
VII proposes possible solutions for these problems. Finally,
this comment concludes that the legal provisions for protect-
ing groundwater are deficient, and that a stronger commit-
ment to the preservation of groundwater must be established
through a three part scheme. First, an effective bilateral
treaty must be accepted; second, a joint commission dedicated
solely to protecting the unseen reservoirs must be estab-
lished; and third, comprehensive groundwater legislation
holding polluters strictly liable for groundwater pollution,
and compelling polluters to pay for purification costs of pol-
luted reservoirs and aqueducts must be enacted. Without
such a binding scheme to restrict pollution of groundwater,
the potential for catastrophic environmental harm more dev-
23. See Bellagio Treaty, infra part VII. See also Robert D. Hayton & Albert
E. Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 663 (1989) [hereinafter Transboundary Groundwaters].
11331996]
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astating than Love Canal is not only possible, but
inescapable.
II. A Background of Groundwater
For centuries, groundwater has been a vital drinking and
irrigation source, necessary for agriculture and the growth of
civilization. 24 Even today, vast modern urban centers draw
much of their water from underground aquifers. 25 Ground-
water comprises the majority of free-flowing, fresh water
available to human beings. 26 Ninety percent of the popula-
tions of Tunisia and Belgium rely on groundwater.27 Two-
thirds of all water used in Israel is groundwater, and three-
fourths of the public water supply of Denmark, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands is
extracted from underground aquifers. 28 The United States
draws forty-five percent of its drinking water from
groundwater. 29
Groundwater is "subsurface water that lies beneath the
water table."3 0 "Pure" groundwater exhibits many desirable
qualities, including "clarity, bacterial purity, consistent tem-
perature, and chemical quality."3 ' These qualities make
24. For a comprehensive background of international groundwater law, see
Albert E. Utton, The Development of International Groundwater Law, in INTER-
NATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW 1-3 (1981).
25. HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 7.
26. Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Non-Navigational Uses of International Wa-
tercourses, in 84 AM. Soc'Y bW'L L. PROC. OF THE 84TH ANNUAL MEETING 228
(George Denney ed., 1991).
27. Transboundary Groundwaters, supra note 23, at 674.
28. Id.
29. James T. B. Tripp & Adam B. Jaffe, Preventing Groundwater Pollution:
Towards a Coordinated Strategy to Protect Critical Recharge Zones, 3 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1979).
30. HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 2. Beneath the surface of the earth
lie zones of saturation and zones of aeration. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at
484. Groundwater is found below the zone of aeration, in the zone of satura-
tion. Id. The size of the zones is variable; the zone of saturation may extend to
the surface, and the zone of aeration may be inches or hundreds of feet thick.
Id. The water table may extend up to the top of the zone of saturation. Id. at
484.
31. FREEZE & CHERRY, supra note 3, at 8, citing McGuiness, The Role of
Groundwater in the National Water Situation, U.S. Geol. Surv. Water-Supply
Paper 1800 (1963).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/37
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groundwater especially desirable as a source of drinking
water. 32
Groundwater movement is determined by rock porosity
33
and soil zones.34 Rock formations that allow sufficient
groundwater movement and collection to occur are called aq-
uifers.35 An aquifer is "best defined as a saturated permeable
geological unit that can transmit significant quantities of
water under ordinary hydraulic gradients."36 Groundwater
and surface water have a complex interrelationship, each dis-
charging into and recharging from the other.37 Groundwa-
ters that continually recharge are characterized as flow
resources.38 If flow resources are depleted too quickly, the
groundwater supply may become exhausted.39 An aquifer
with little or no recharge is considered a stock resource, an
exhaustible commodity. 40
Mexico and the United States share underground aquifer
basins connected to the Rio Grande, and the Colorado, Ti-
juana, Santa Cruz, and New Rivers. 41 While many of the aq-
uifers at the border are flow resources, the increased
demands upon these aquifers may have disastrous conse-
quences for them and the rivers associated with them.42 A
plan for managed extraction is thus crucial for the preserva-
tion of these areas.
32. HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 7.
33. Underground openings are considered pores, and they vary in shape,
size or arrangement. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 486.
34. FREEZE & CHERRY, supra note 3, at 7. Soil zones are fields of soil
through which groundwater flows. Id.
35. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 486. An aquifer may range in size from
a few feet to hundreds of yards deep, and may also be referred to as a reservoir.
Id.
36. FREEZE & CHERRY, supra note 3, at 47.
37. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 4. Groundwater discharges into
surface water comprise thirty percent of the volume of surface stream flow in
the United States. Id.
38. Utton, supra note 1, at 657.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. M. Diane Barber, The Legal Dilemma of Groundwater Under the Inte-
grated Environmental Plan for Mexico-United States Border Area, 24 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 639, 680 (1993).
42. Id.
11351996]
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III. The Current Legal Status of Groundwater Within
the United States and Mexico
A. American Water Law
Despite the interstate nature of groundwater and the po-
tential for conflict between state laws regulating ground-
water use and protection, no federal statute exists that has
groundwater protection as its primary objective. 43 However,
several federal statutes protect groundwater peripherally.44
Underlying this patchwork of federal statutes are a number
of groundwater protection doctrines that individual western
states have developed and codified.45 The overall effect of
this regulatory jumble is that the United States lacks an
overarching and uniform groundwater protection policy, re-
sulting in the inefficient use and waste of a valuable
resource. 46
1. Federal Law
a. The Clean Water Act
In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act
(CWA), with the express objective "to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters."47 Although section 102 of the CWA requires develop-
ment of "comprehensive programs for preventing, reducing or
eliminating the pollution of the navigable waters and ground
waters and improving the sanitary condition of surface and
underground waters,"48 the federal courts have interpreted
the CWA to apply primarily to surface waters. 49 Under sec-
tions 301 and 304 of the CWA, Congress authorized the Envi-
43. LARRY MORANDI, STATE GROUNDWATER PROTECTION POLICIES: A LEGIS-
LATOR'S GUIDE 7 (Sharon Schwoch ed., 1989).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 7.
47. CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
48. Id.
49. See Jeffrey G. Miller and Nancy L. Long, Introduction to Environmental'
Law, v. 1, ch. 3, 45 (Fall 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Professor
Jeffrey G. Miller at Pace University School of Law).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/37
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ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish guidelines
for national water quality standards.5 0
Of particular interest to transboundary disputes is sec-
tion 310, entitled "International Pollution Abatement."5 1
Under section 310(a), the EPA may bring suit against Ameri-
can companies producing pollution within the United States
when that pollution subsequently "endangers the health or
welfare of persons in a foreign country."52 Under sec-
tion 310(a), United States' courts have power, through the
EPA, to award damages to foreign nations for causes of action
originating in the United States. 53 To recover damages, the
EPA must make an "endangerment finding," to show that a
causal connection exists between the pollution originating in
the United States and the injury in the foreign nation.5 4
Moreover, the EPA must also make a "reciprocity finding," a
finding that the foreign state confers equal recovery power on
the United States for injuries from pollution originating
within the foreign nation's boundaries. 55 To date, section
310(a) of the CWA remains "a lame duck," as it has yet to be
employed in an international case.
56
b. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
In 1976, Congress passed the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA). Originally, RCRA was implemented to
address the problems created by the CWA and the Clean Air
50. CWA §§ 301, 304, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314.
51. CWA § 310, 33 U.S.C. § 1320.
52. CWA § 310(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1320(a).
53. Id., 33 U.S.C. § 1320(a). See also Khakee, supra note 21, at 862. But see
Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9) (establish-
ing the principle of sovereign immunity upon notice of an injury to an interna-
tional waterway); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611
(1988 & Supp. 1990) (establishing the principle that foreign nations may avoid
liability through the act of state doctrine).
54. Khakee, supra note 21, at 862.
55. Id.
56. Id. (discussing the implementation of the reciprocity and endangerment
findings under CWA sections 310(a) and 505(a) as methods of complying with
international standards of transboundary water pollution).
11371996]
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Act;57 since polluters could no longer pollute water or air, pol-
luters turned to dumping wastes into landfills. RCRA was
designed to force planning and management practices for
land disposal. 58 However, RCRA only provides regulation for
certain wastes, and excludes solids or dissolved materials in
domestic sewage, irrigation return flows, industrial point
sources subject to the CWA, nuclear wastes, exploration and
production wastes, and certain mining wastes.59
In the RCRA process, facilities must obtain permits to
handle solid or hazardous wastes.60 RCRA protects ground-
water by restricting the generation of leachate and by creat-
ing a method of removing leachate before it enters the soil
and groundwater. 6' Moreover, RCRA allows the Administra-
tor to bring suit if any handling of solid or hazardous waste
presents an "imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment."62
c. The Safe Drinking Water Act
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) was enacted in
1974 to protect and ensure drinking water quality.63 Con-
gress created the SDWA to provide sanitary water supplies,
to protect aquifers, and to control the injection of wastes into
subsurface waters. 64
The Underground Injection Control program under the
SDWA prohibits the disposal of hazardous wastes into under-
ground drinking water sources. 65 Permits to inject waste into
nearly impenetrable wells are available, but the permittee
must certify that the injection will not endanger water
57. RUTH PATRICK ET AL., GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 371 (2d ed. 1987).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 372.
60. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) § 1002, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6901 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
61. PATRICK ET AL., supra note 57, at 375.
62. Id. at 377.
63. Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1974 &
Supp. 1988).
64. PATRICK ET AL., supra note 57, at 382.
65. Id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/37
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sources. 66 In this way, the SDWA enables the EPA to protect
sole source aquifers from contamination. 67 A sole source aq-
uifer is one that is the only principal source of drinking water
for an area.68 Once designated by the EPA, no new under-
ground injection wells can be drilled without a permit.69 Fi-
nally, the SDWA, like RCRA, has an imminent hazard
provision, under which the EPA or the public can prosecute
violators. 70
2. State Law
The states address their surface water law through a
combination of two doctrines: riparian rights and prior ap-
propriation. 71 The riparian system, practiced for the most
part in the eastern states, bases water rights on ownership of
the land on which, or through which, the water flows.
72
These landowners own correlative rights in the water; that is,
they must share equally in times of shortage. 73 Even in times
of plenty, riparian users have a duty to use the water reason-
ably and not to harm the other users.74 The question of rea-
sonableness is largely a court-decided issue, and is based on
general tort principles. 75
In the western states, where water is much less plentiful,
water allocation has generally followed a system of priority of
use apart from ownership of the surrounding land.76 This
system, called prior appropriation, allows people and busi-
66. Id. at 383.
67. Id.
68. PATRICK ET AL., supra note 57, at 383.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 3.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 3, 52-53.
74. Id. at 90.
75. TARLoCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 94. The Restatement Second of Torts
section 850A sets out factors relevant to reasonable use in the riparian doctrine,
including the purpose and suitability of the use, its economic and social values,
the nature and extent of the harm caused to other users, the practicability of
avoiding the harm, and the equitable principle of "requiring the user causing
harm to bear the loss." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1977 & Supp.
1995).
76. See TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 3, 149-391.
11391996]
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nesses in completely dry areas to have access to water. 77 The
doctrine dictates that first users take priority over later ap-
propriators and do not have to share in times of shortage. 78
All users, however, must make a beneficial use of all of their
recorded water rights, and cannot let the water sit idle or be
wasted.79 This requirement ensures the maximum efficient
use of surface water.80
Most states have since departed from strict adherence to
their original water doctrines, and have passed statutes cre-
ating water permit systems and state water management
agencies to apply and enforce the statutes.81 These agencies
generally do not address issues of water quality or pollution,
despite the relationship between water quantity and
quality.8 2
Historically, groundwater use was never a part of these
allocation systems.8 3 Many states granted all groundwater
rights to whoever owned the overlying land, with no duty to
share.8 4 In Texas, for example, courts have consistently up-
held this type of absolute ownership rule.8 5 Other states
have prorated the amount of a groundwater allotment accord-
ing to the relative amounts of land owned. 6 Most modern
courts, however, attempt to address the needs of later pump-
77. See id. at 149-50; WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAwS IN THE
NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 159-75 (1971), reprinted in TARLOCK ET AL., supra
note 7, at 151.
78. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 149.
79. Id. at 177-78, 195.
80. Id. at 195-96. See also Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co.,
205 F. 123, 129 (8th Cir. 1913).
81. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 3. Colorado is the sole western state
that does not govern water rights through a permit system. Id. at 3, 243.
82. Id. at 229. See also David H. Getches, Water Planning: Untapped Op-
portunity for the Western States, 19 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 1 (1988), reprinted in
TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 272-75; Tripp & Jaffe, supra note 29, at 9
("Relationship Between Depletion and Pollution"). Only California has com-
bined the governance of both issues in one administrative body, the State Water
Resources Control Board. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CONTROLLING WATER USE:
THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WATER QUALITY PROTECTION 91-120 (1991), re-
printed in TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 227, 229.
83. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 478-79.
84. Id. at 494.
85. Id. at 501. See also Barber, supra note 41, at 678-79.
86. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 494-95.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/37
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ers (those who utilize groundwater), and of the general pub-
lic, in apportioning water rights.87 Pumpers have also been
required to share in times of shortage, to put the water to a
reasonable use, and not to harm other users.88 In addition,
many states, recognizing the possibility of groundwater de-
pletion, have started to integrate groundwater into their
water allocation statutes.8 9 Arizona, for example, has passed
"sweeping new laws designed to protect depleting aquifers."90
State agencies have regulated pumping rates and have im-
posed "safe-yield" requirements. 91
As with surface water, the regulation of groundwater pol-
lution exists entirely apart from groundwater allocation.
92
Some states have passed comprehensive groundwater quality
statutes that provide for the regulation of a wide variety of
discharge sources, and include provisions for groundwater
monitoring and for aquifer mapping and classification.
93
These statutes are enforced through pollutant standards, dis-
charge permits, and land use management plans.94 More
states, however, legislate groundwater according to specific
groundwater contamination problems, such as pesticides and
leaking underground storage tanks. 95
Since each state applies water and groundwater law in-
dependently from any other state, the coordination of those
87. Id. at 515.
88. Id. at 52-53, 515.
89. Id. at 515.
90. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 516. Groundwater depletion can also
cause saltwater intrusion and/or the collapse of the underlying aquifer, causing
land damage and the permanent reduction of the water source. See id. at 515.
91. Id. at 515. A "safe yield" is the amount of water that can be taken out of
the aquifer that will still ensure reliable supplies of water for the future. Id.
The amount set will depend on the annual rate of recharge of the aquifer in
question. Id. The yield for aquifers that do not recharge is set according to the
length of time the state water board or legislature determines the source should
last. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 515. See also Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 421
P.2d 771 (N.M. 1966) (mandating the use of a fixed rate of withdrawal to deter-
mine the economic life of a water basin).
92. Id., supra note 7, at 516.
93. MORANDI, supra note 43, at 14.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 13-14. For a table comparing the groundwater legislation of every
state, see id. at 16-17.
11411996]
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laws can be complicated. The water law of the four border
states (Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California, from
east to west) constitutes nothing less than a Gordian knot of
regulation, and no state-wide unified plan to address the
water of the border region has yet been created. The water
laws of these four states are addressed separately below.
a. Texas
Texas, which shares aquifers with both Mexico and New
Mexico in the upper and lower Rio Grande Valleys, 96 has the
least regulatory protection of groundwater of the four border
states. 97 While some legislation allows the Texas Water
Commission to enact groundwater regulations,98 the only
such regulation passed was a management plan for the Ed-
wards Aquifer.99 Surface water regulation in Texas has
evolved from Hispanic law, to the riparian system, to the sys-
tem of prior appropriation, and is now governed by a water
rights adjudication system. 100 Groundwater rights, however,
are rights of absolute ownership. '0 ' A right of absolute own-
ership is intrinsically linked to the land; whoever owns the
land owns the water beneath the land. 0 2 Consequently, ab-
solute ownership engenders unchecked competition between
users and provides no restrictions on uses that adversely af-
fect nearby landowners. 03 One author described Texas
groundwater ideology as: "[wihere there is competition for di-
96. See Barbara G. Burman & Thomas G. Cornish, Needed: A Ground-
Water Treaty Between The United States and Mexico, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J.
385, 391 (1975); Barber, supra note 41, at 680.
97. See Barber, supra note 41, at 676-80; James N. Castleberry, Jr., A Pro-
posal for Adoption of a Legal Doctrine of Ground-Stream Water Interrelation-
ship in Texas, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 503, 503 (1975).
98. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 28.011 (West 1988).
99. Barber, supra note 41, at 676-77.
100. AMERICAN WATER WORKS ASSOCIATION, WATER RIGHTS OF THE FIFTY
STATES AND TERRITORIES 65 (Kenneth R. Wright ed., 1990).
101. Id.
102. Barber, supra note 41, at 678-79.
103. Id. at 677, 679. See also Friendswood Dev. v. Smith-S.W. Indus., Inc.,
576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978). Negligent pumping which causes a neighbor's land
to collapse is actionable, however. Id. Malicious pumping, designed specifically
to injure another landowner is also actionable. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at
494; Barber, supra note 41, at 679.
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minishing groundwater reserves, 'the biggest pump wins.'"'10 4
Moreover, Texas courts refuse to recognize the relationship
between surface and groundwater, 10 5 and the Texas Water
Commission may only regulate withdrawals from streams. 1
0 6
Until the Texas legislature rectifies these problems, the en-
tire region's aquifers are at risk of depletion and
contamination.10 7
b. New Mexico
There are 75,546 square miles of aquifers in New Mex-
ico.108 Six of New Mexico's underground water basins are
shared with Mexico: the San Simon, San Luis, and Hachita
basins of Hidalgo County; the Wamel and Mimbres basins of
Luna County; and the Rio Grande-Mesilla basin of Dona Ana
County. 10 9 New Mexico is the only state to fully recognize the
relationship between surface water and groundwater, and
has a relatively progressive regulatory system. 110 Water law
in New Mexico, for both surface water and groundwater, de-
veloped according to the prior appropriation doctrine princi-
ple of "first in time, first in right.""' The state now requires
permits for all surface water use and for the use of declared
underground water basins, 112 and the State Engineer may
promulgate regulations to limit groundwater mining.1
3
104. WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 43 (2d ed. 1988).
105. Barber, supra note 41, at 679 & nn. 217 & 218. This refusal stems from
the viewpoint that groundwater is only "percolating" and not actually part of a
water course. Id. However, a Texas court did uphold the Texas Water Commis-
sion's specific declaration that the Edwards Aquifer was an underground river,
and thus within the Commission's jurisdiction. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at
491. See also Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO-91-CA-069, 993 WL 151353 (W.D.
Tex. Feb. 1, 1993); Castleberry, supra note 97 (arguing for the Texas courts and
legislature to consider surface and groundwater a single, unified hydrologic
system).
106. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 490.
107. See Tripp & Jaffe, supra note 29, at 9 (discussing how overmining of
groundwater can cause contamination).
108. Barber, supra note 41, at 673.
109. Burman & Cornish, supra note 96, at 391.
110. Barber, supra note 41, at 675.
111. AMERICAN WATER WoRKS ASSOCIATION, supra note 100, at 57-58.
112. Id. at 58.
113. GOLDFARB, supra note 104, at 47.
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Moreover, while groundwater rights in New Mexico may be
sold or transferred, such sales or transfers must first be ap-
proved by the State Engineer.114 Rights that are not used
within four years forfeit back to the state. 115 New Mexico
nevertheless allows a pumper to deplete up to two-thirds of
his groundwater over a forty year period.1 16 Furthermore,
New Mexico cannot control the water basins it shares with
Mexico or Texas, especially since the latter allows unlimited
pumping."17
c. Arizona
Arizona, which shares groundwater basins with Mexico
in the Yuma, Pina, Santa Cruz, and Cochise Counties,"8 has
one of the country's most comprehensive and complex water
laws. 119 While surface water is governed according to court
adjudicated appropriation, 20 groundwater is governed by the
1980 Groundwater Management Act (GMA). 12 1 The legisla-
ture adopted the GMA in response to severe overmining and
depletion of groundwater resources caused by the state's de-
pendence on irrigation-heavy agriculture. 22 The GMA cre-
ated four Active Management Areas (AMAs), each of which
covers a basin or sub-basin, in which new uses of water were
severely restricted. 23 The GMA also created a Department
of Water Resources to implement its provisions. 24 In each
114. Barber, supra note 41, at 673.
115. AMERICAN WATER WORKS ASSOCIATION, supra note 100, at 58.
116. GOLDFARB, supra note 104, at 47.
117. See supra section III.A.2.a.
118. Burman & Cornish, supra note 96, at 390.
119. GOLDFARB, supra note 104, at 46.
120. AMERICAN WATER WORKS ASSOCIATION, supra note 100, at 38.
121. GOLDFARB, supra note 104, at 46. See also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-
411 (1980 & Supp. 1987).
122. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 545-47. See also Barber, supra note 41,
at 670-71.
123. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 547. The four AMAs created were
Phoenix, Tucson, Prescott, and Pinal, corresponding to 80 percent of Arizona's
population, and 69 percent of the state's water use. Id. The GMA also created
another type of restricted use area called the Irrigation Non-Expansion Area
(INEA). Id.
124. Id.
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AMA, the GMA seeks to achieve "safe yield"125 by the year
2025, by mandating the adoption of plans which would incor-
porate use reductions, pump taxes, retirement of irrigated
lands, and conditions on new uses. 126 However, the GMA
protects existing uses in AMAs by making such uses vested
rights, although transfers and conversions of such rights
must meet specific requirements. 127 Outside of the AMAs, by
contrast, groundwater extraction is controlled only by the
doctrine of "reasonable use." This doctrine allows pumpers to
divert as much water as they want from their own land, as
long as they use the water on the overlying land and do not
waste it.128 This strange hybrid of tight and loose control
over groundwater sources in Arizona, along with the state's
separate regulatory treatment of surface and groundwater,
undermines the effectiveness of the GMA.' 29
d. California
California shares groundwater with Mexico in two main
regions: around the Tijuana River in San Diego County, and
around the Colorado River in the Imperial Valley.1 30 Califor-
nia water law developed according to the tenets of prior ap-
propriation, riparian rights, and, in places where an
American city grew up over an existing Spanish or Mexican
pueblo, pueblo water rights.131 The prior appropriation sys-
tem is regulated under the California Water Code according
to a permit system administered by the State Water Re-
125. See supra text accompanying note 91.
126. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 269-70 (2d ed. 1990).
127. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 548-53.
128. GOLDFARB, supra note 104, at 43-44. See also Bristor v. Cheatham, 255
P.2d 173, 178 (Ariz. 1953).
129. See Robert J. Glennon, "Because That's Where the Water Is": Retiring
Current Water Uses to Achieve the Safe-Yield Objective of the Arizona Ground-
water Management Act, 33 ARIz. L. REV. 89, 105 (1991); Barber, supra note 41,
at 672-73.
130. Burman & Cornish, supra note 96, at 389.
131. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 241-42. See also AMERICAN WATER
WORKS ASSOCIATION, supra note 100, at 39-40.
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sources Control Board (SWRCB).132 However, in regions of
ancient riparian and pueblo rights, and in areas governed by
prior appropriation since 1914, this permit system does not
apply.133 In dealing with this complex hybrid of doctrines,
the SWRCB gives priority to the earliest applicable doctrine
(usually the riparian doctrine), 34 but automatically applies
the permit requirement to all appropriated water rights ob-
tained after 1914.135 For certain designated watersheds and
subterranean streams, but not for non-flowing aquifers, con-
flicts in water rights are settled by an adjudicated decree. 136
Despite this comprehensive, if complex, system of surface
water regulation, California has yet to pass a similarly thor-
ough permit-based, state-wide groundwater law. 137 As such,
no permit is needed for groundwater use, unless such ground-
water exists in subterranean streams. 138 Instead, ground-
water rights are determined according to a form of correlative
rights similar to the riparian system for water used on the
overlying land,13 9 and according to prior appropriation princi-
ples if the water is to be used elsewhere.140 This quilt of doc-
trines does little to protect the groundwater resources on
which the state relies so heavily for irrigation. 14 1 Instead,
certain municipalities, especially in northern California, have
passed local legislation restricting pumping and/or imposing
132. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 241. Also, the state constitution re-
quires that "all water rights not exceed an amount of water reasonably required
for the purposes of the adjacent lands." Id., citing CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
133. Id. at 242.
134. GOLDFARB, supra note 104, at 33.
135. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 242.
136. Id. However, the California legislature allowed such an adjudicated de-
cree in 1971 for the aquifer connected to the Scott River after withdrawal of
groundwater caused decreased surface water flow. Id.
137. Barber, supra note 41, at 667; AMERICAN WATER WORKS ASSOCIATION,
supra note 100, at 39-40.
138. AMERICAN WATER WoRKS AssOCLATION, supra note 100, at 40; TARLOCK
ET AL., supra note 7, at 241.
139. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 558.
140. Barber, supra note 41, at 669. In such cases, overlying users have prior-
ity over transporters. GOLDFARB, supra note 104, at 45.
141. Barber, supra note 41, at 667. Municipal suppliers and industry also
use California aquifers. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 557.
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/37
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pump taxes.142 Finally, some California courts have held
that groundwater mining is limited by the "safe yield"
amount 143 for the basin in question.'" Nevertheless, along
the Mexico border, aquifers have been subject to salt intru-
sion, land collapse, and contamination. 45
B. Mexican Water Law
Mexican groundwater law, like American groundwater
law, currently regulates the aquifers that feed the Colorado,
Tijuana, Santa Cruz, San Pedro, and New Rivers, and the Rio
Grande. 146 Mexican groundwater law arises out of Article 27
of the Mexican Constitution, which vests all subsoil and min-
eral rights in the national government.147 In 1934, pursuant
to Article 27, Mexico passed the National Water Act, which
specifies priorities for water utilization. 48 Then, in 1947, the
Mexican legislature passed the Health and Engineering Act
of 1947, granting the Mexican government complete control
of the nation's water delivery systems.149 Nine years later,
the Mexican legislature passed the Law of Groundwaters,
142. Barber, supra note 41, at 667-68.
143. See supra text accompanying note 91.
144. See Pasadena v. Aihambra, 207 P.2d 17, 28 (Cal. 1949). However, the
court has since noted that "safe yield" does not apply when municipalities are
involved. GOLDFARB, supra note 104, at 45.
145. Barber, supra note 41, at 670; TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 564-65.
Such problems exist at the border even though the SWRCB has the authority to
restrict pumping or create structural solutions, or both, to prevent "irreparable
injury" to groundwater quality. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2100-2102 (West 1993).
Commonly recognized methods of controlling salt water intrusion are:
(1) reduction of pumping or rearrangement of pumping patterns;
(2) recharge of the basin (ordinarily with imported water) to raise the ground-
water level above sea level;
(3) creation of a coastal fresh water ridge through injection wells and spreading
basins;
(4) construction of an artificial subsurface physical barrier;
(5) creation of a pumping trough along the coast.
TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 7, at 564-65.
146. See Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 22, at 223.
147. Stephen P. Mumme, The U.S. Conflict Over Transboundary Groundwa-
ters: Some Institutional and Political Considerations, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 505, 518. See CONST. art. 27, para. 1 (Mex.).
148. See Mumme, supra note 147, at 518.
149. See id.
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which established a permitting system to regulate the devel-
opment of groundwaters.150
The first major environmental statute of Mexico, the
Federal Law for the Prevention and Control of Environmen-
tal Pollution, was passed in 1971.151 One year later, the Fed-
eral Law of Environmental Protection was passed, the third
chapter of which was devoted to water pollution. 15 2 These
two laws emphasized fines for environmental damage with-
out considering the cause and possible prevention of such
damage. 153
Modern Mexican water law was established in 1988 by
the General Law on Ecological Equilibrium and Environmen-
tal Protection (GLEEEP), which superseded previous envi-
ronmental laws in Mexico.' 54 Prior to the passage of
GLEEEP, environmental laws emphasized financial compen-
sation for damage already done. 155 GLEEEP, by contrast, fo-
cused on the prevention and enforcement of environmental
regulations. 1 56 GLEEEP operates as a comprehensive envi-
ronmental statute, taking precedence over all other previous
statutes.157 Most recently, in 1992, the Mexican National
Water Law, in combination with GLEEEP, set forth "the
legal framework for water pollution control in Mexico." 158
Through GLEEEP, the Mexican government urged decentral-
ization of environmental laws, with the states taking in-
creased responsibility.159 By 1992, twenty-nine of the thirty-
150. Id. This permitting system is similar to that of the Clean Water Act.
See CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
151. Federal Law for the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollu-
tion, D.O. (1971).
152. Federal law of Environmental Protection, D.O. (1972).
153. BNA Reporter: 247:0101, § 113 at 171 (1992).
154. General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection,
D.O. (1988) (providing for the protection of natural resources, as well as the
prevention of pollution).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, EPA, EVALUATION OF MExmco's ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS (PRELIMINARY VERSION OF FINAL
REPORT) 7 (1993) [hereinafter EVALUATION].
159. BNA Reporter: 247:0101, § 113 at 171 (1992).
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one Mexican states had enacted environmental regulations
equivalent to, or tougher than, the federal law.'
6 0
Before 1992, the Mexican federal agency Secretaria de
Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia (Ministry of Urban Develop-
ment and Ecology) (SEDUE), was responsible for overseeing
and implementing both state and federal surface water law in
Mexico.161 SEDUE, in active association with the EPA, es-
tablished the Integrated Environmental Border Plan
(IEBP).' 62 In 1992, however, SEDESOL took over the envi-
ronmental functions of SEDUE.163 Before the adoption of the
IEBP, when the Secretary of Agriculture and Water Re-
sources directed groundwater regulation, 64 no comprehen-
sive permitting system or enforcement measures to thwart
groundwater pollution existed. Now, however, the IEBP,
GLEEEP, and the National Water Law contain provisions
which specifically address groundwater pollution.
Articles 120 through 125 of GLEEEP cover technical dis-
charge standards for "releases from: industry; municipali-
ties; agriculture and livestock activities; mining; the use of
pesticides, fertilizers and toxic substances; infiltrations into
aquifers; solid waste dumping; and federal facilities." 6 5 In
some cases GLEEEP maintains stricter regulations than the
United States by detailing specific standards for landfill sit-
ing near groundwater aquifers.' 66 GLEEEP specifically re-
quires that hazardous waste, in landfills which are connected
160. EVALUATION, supra note 158, at 21. Campeche and Tlaxcala are the two
Mexican states that have not adopted environmental laws. Id. at 21 n.11.
161. BNA Reporter: 247:0101, § 113 (1992).
162. Id. See Justin Ward & Glenn T. Prickett, Prospects for a Green Trade
Agreement. Overview, 34 ENVT 44 (1992).
163. BNA Reporter: 247:0101, § 113 (1992).
SEDESOL, a cabinet level agency, was originally created as part of
the Mexican Government's economic development reform program,
and therefore oversees regional development, urban development,
housing, and indigenous peoples, in addition to environmental pro-
tection and conservation of natural resources.
Id.
164. Id.
165. EVALUATION, supra note 158, at 34. The EPA acknowledges that these
standards are similar to those of the Clean Water Act. Id. at 35.
166. Id. at 66.
114919961
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to groundwater aquifers, be controlled or confined according
to more rigid regulations than the EPA requires. 167
"SEDESOL has a mandate to work with the United States on
the Integrated Environmental Border Plan to improve envi-
ronmental laws and the mechanisms to enforce them, and to
attempt to privatize infrastructure projects and public serv-
ices to take advantage of private sector environmental
capabilities."168
IV. The International Environmental Context
International environmental law is rooted in both cus-
tomary international law and domestic environmental law.
Customary international law is established by individual sov-
ereign nations through state practice (a country's voluntary
creation of norms and standards) and through the doctrine of
opinio juris (the international acceptance of these norms as
binding laws). 169 Domestic national environmental law
manifests itself principally through federal and state legisla-
tion.170 Historically, nations have addressed the issue of en-
vironmental pollution through domestic law. 171 However,
because pollution does not abide by politically established
territorial boundaries, its effects are of international concern.
Furthermore, since domestic law represents the moral and
ethical principles of only a single sovereign nation, it cannot
adequately address all nations' legal and cultural views of the
environment.172
167. Id. SEDESOL, the Comisidn Nacional de Aguas (CNA) (a unit of the
Secretariat of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (SARH)), and the Secreta-
riat of the Navy promulgate water quality standards. Id. at 33, 34.
168. Id. at 2-3.
169. See infra part W.A. for an additional discussion of opinio juris.
170. See generally CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387; Clean Air Act (CAA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1984 & Supp. 1993); and Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1980 & Supp. 1987).
171. See, e.g., Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.) 3 U.N. Rep. Int. Arb. Awards
1911 (Apr. 15, 1935).
172. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values, and Functions, 216
REC. DES Cotms 22 (1989), reprinted in HENKN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
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A. Background in International Environmental Law
Central to international cooperative action lies the con-
cept ofjus cogens, which has been defined by the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties as "peremptory norms" of
general international law.173 Under Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention, a peremptory norm is a conclusive standard
which can "be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character." 74 A peremp-
tory norm is a norm "from which no derogation is permitted,"
and which the international community of states has ac-
cepted and recognized.175 This concept was articulated in the
oft-quoted Paquete Habana case, in which the United States
Supreme Court noted, "where there is no treaty, and no con-
trolling executive or legislative act or judicial decision [be-
tween disputing states], resort must be had to the customs
and usages of civilized nations."
76
In order for a usage or norm to be considered a custom-
ary rule of international law, two tests or doctrines should be
followed. 177 The state action doctrine involves the recurrence
or repetition of acts;' 78 in order for certain conduct to become
a customary rule, it must be regular and repeated. 179 Since
the practices to which nations adhere are performed volunta-
rily, state action is often determined by what is politically
and economically convenient for the nation at the time of the
action. As noted in the acclaimed North Sea Continental
Shelf case,
The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not
in itself enough. There are many international acts, e.g.,
173. See HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 91
(1993).
174. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 130 (2d
ed. 1995).
175. Id. In cases where a new peremptory norm emerges, an existing treaty
will become void if it is in conflict with that norm. Id.
176. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (establishing the princi-
ple of application of international law when no national law addresses the
issue).
177. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 174, at 143.
178. Id.
179. Id.
11511996]
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in the field of ceremon[y] and protocol, which are per-
formed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by
considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and
not by any sense of legal duty.180
Thus, conduct is not considered law until the nation ex-
presses a commitment to that practice. A "[s]tate practice
consists of the duration, consistency, repetition and general-
ity of the particular custom."1'8 Evidence of any state prac-
tice is often confirmed through treaties, diplomatic
correspondence, United Nations resolutions, and statements
of diplomats. 8 2 Without the subjective and manifest intent
of the nation to follow such law, however, even annually-re-
peated state practices enumerated through international cor-
respondence do not become law.'8 3
The second doctrine is that of opinio juris, in which
"[riecurrence of the usage or practice tends to develop an ex-
pectation that, in similar situations, the same conduct or the
abstention therefrom will be repeated."18 4 Opinio ju r is is the
subjective element of state action; it expresses the desire of
state actors to legally conform to specific international con-
duct. 18 5 The critical element of this concept is that, once a
state expresses opinio juris and performs consistently, its
conduct becomes binding as a matter of international law.'8 6
International law addressed environmental issues as
early as 1935 in the famous Trail Smelter case.'8 7 In that
180. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 44
(Judgment of Feb. 20).
181. Suzanne M. Bernard, Environmental Warfare: Iraq's Use of the Oil
Weapon During the Gulf Conflict, 6 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 106, 112 (N.Y. St. B.A.
1993).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 174, at 144. When a state conforms to
an usage merely as an element of courtesy, there is an absence of opinio juris.
Id.
185. Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 HARv.
L. REV. 1484, 1504 n.73 (1991). See also C. ROUSSEAU, DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 78 (11th ed. 1987).
186. HENIUN ET AL., supra note 172, at 82.
187. Trail Smelter Case, supra note 171 (holding that, where no applicable
international law exists, application of American domestic law is appropriate to
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/37
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case, a special international tribunal set the precedent of sup-
plementing international environmental law with individual
states' environmental statutes.'88 In 1947, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) continued to expand the scope of inter-
national environmental law in the celebrated Corfu Channel
case,18 9 which has been heralded as establishing the doctrine
of state responsibility under international environmental
law.190 In that case, the ICJ established the principle that
nations that are responsible for "imminent dangers" to the
environment bear a duty to inform other nations of such dan-
gers. 19 The ICJ drew its authority from the "elementary
considerations of humanity... and ... the obligation, resting
on every state, not to knowingly allow its territory to be used
for acts contrary to the rights of other states."
92
By requiring states to refrain from using their territory
in an injurious manner towards others, the ICJ effectively in-
jected the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas9 3 into
the body of international law.' 94 With the acceptance of ex-
tended state territorial responsibility, the international com-
munity attained the necessary authority to express
environmental concerns in conventions and declarations. 95
address the damaging effects of transboundary air pollution within American
borders from pollution stemming from a Canadian-owned corporation).
188. Id.
189. Corfu Channel Case, supra note 53.
190. Developments in the Law, supra note 185, at 1497 n.31. See also JAMES
BARnos & DOUoLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 75
(1974) (Although the danger to the environment was located within territorial
boundaries, if the danger had fallen outside these limits, the state's responsibil-
ity would have been recognized).
191. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAw AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUB.
LIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 337, 339 (5th ed. 1986).
192. Id.
193. "[One should use his own property in such a manner as not to injure
that of another." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990).
194. Khakee, supra note 21, at 852. The application of this concept is vital to
international environmental principles and to the notion of state responsibility
for transboundary pollution. Id.
195. But see id. (expressing the paralysis of the sic utere principle in relation
to international environmental violations); Developments in the Law, supra
note 185, at 1508 n.96 (calling the sic utere principle "mere verbiage"). Some
authors also note that to avoid pollution of international waterways, the eco-
nomic cost of preventing the harm should be balanced against the economic loss
11531996]
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Since the Trail Smelter and Corfu Channel cases, the in-
ternational community has made general environmental dec-
larations as expressions of customary international law.' 96
By 1972, the United Nations General Assembly had created a
foundation for international cooperation concerning the envi-
ronment by passing the Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, 97 better known as
the Stockholm Declaration. A decade later, the General As-
sembly reaffirmed international commitment to the environ-
ment in the World Charter for Nature, 98 with 111 nations
voting to adopt the Charter. 99 The Charter reaffirms inter-
national respect for nature in times of both peace and war.200
Most recently, the international community expressed con-
cern for the environment through the 1992 Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development.201 The Declaration reit-
erates Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, calling for
state "responsibility to ensure that activities within their ju-
risdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment
of other States .... ,,202 Further, the Declaration calls for
that would result from stopping the harm. See McCaffrey, supra note 10, at
231.
196. See, e.g., Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C.48/14 (Stockholm, 1972) [hereinafter
Stockholm], reprinted in Louis HENKIN ET AL., BASIc DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT
TO INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIAL 698-703 (1993) [hereinafter
HENKIN, SUPP.]; World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, Supp.
No. 51, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/37/L.4/Add.1 (1982), reprinted in HENKIN, SUPP.,
supra, at 703-10 [hereinafter Nature]; Rio Declaration on the Environment and
Development, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), reprinted in HEN-
KIN, SuPP., supra, at 710-17. [hereinafter Rio].
197. Stockholm, supra note 196.
198. Nature, supra note 196.
199. The United States cast the only vote against the Charter, and eighteen
states abstained. Bernard, supra note 181, at 111.
200. Nature, supra note 196, para. 12-16.
201. Rio, supra note 196.
202. Rio, supra note 196, at Principle 2; Stockholm, supra note 196.
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign rights to ex-
ploit their natural resources pursuant to their own environmental
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Stockholm, supra note 196, at Principle 21.
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states to enact effective national environmental legisla-
tion.203 Consequently, the Rio Declaration reaffirms the cus-
tomary dependency of international environmental law upon
domestic environmental regulation.
20 4
B. International Agreements Addressing Groundwater
Scant material exists applying general international dec-
larations of environmental protection to groundwater.
20 5
Even documents which contemplate the regulation of ground-
water, such as the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters
of International Rivers206 and the Convention on the Protec-
tion and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and Interna-
tional Lakes, 20 7 fail to do so specifically or exclusively.
208
However, certain bilateral treaties have called for ground-
water pollution control to fall under the jurisdiction of bilat-
eral commissions and institutions. These treaties are
generally found in eastern Europe: the 1955 Yugoslavia-
Hungary Agreement; the 1956 Yugoslavia-Albania Agree-
ment; the 1958 Yugoslavia-Bulgaria Agreement; the 1965 Po-
land-Czechoslovakia Agreement; and the 1964 Poland-USSR
Agreement. 20 9 The 1972 Agreement between Finland and
203. Rio, supra note 196, at Principles 11, 13.
204. See id.
205. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 22, at 202 n.176.
206. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, Report
of the 52nd Conference (Helsinki, 1966), reprinted in HENKIN, SUpp., supra note
196, at 662. Article I of the document explains that "[t]he general rules of inter-
national law as set forth in these chapters are applicable to the use of the wa-
ters of an international drainage basin...." Id. art. I. Article II then defines
international drainage basin as "a geographical area extending over two or
more States determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters, includ-
ing surface and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus." Id. art.
II (emphasis added).
207. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses
and International Lakes (1992), reprinted in HENKIN, Supp., supra note 196, at
668. This Convention discusses the regulation of "transboundary waters,"
which is defined in Article I as "any surface or ground waters." Id. art. I (em-
phasis added).
208. In this way, international law resembles the state of U.S. federal law,
which also lacks a statute exclusively addressing groundwater. See supra dis-
cussion at Part IIIA.1.
209. Ludwik A. Teclaff & Eileen Teclaff, Transboundary Ground Water Pol-
lution: Survey and Trends in Treaty Law, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 629, 642-43
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Sweden and the 1972 Swiss-Italian convention also address
the protection of boundary waters. 210 Although all of these
agreements mention groundwater, the majority refers to "wa-
tercourses" without providing a clear explanation of the rela-
tionships between groundwater and surface water.
Consequently, no international consensus on the treatment of
groundwater exists. The expiration of the IEBP and the in-
tense industrial and population growth along the United
States - Mexico border both serve to intensify the dangers to
groundwater.
V. Bilateral Agreements Between the United States
and Mexico
Mexico and the United States share a long and difficult
history with respect to water. Connected by an expanse of
desert now populated with agricultural and industrial users,
both Mexico and the western United States depend greatly on
the waters of the Colorado River and the Rio Grande. 211 The
two nations have grappled over the Rio Grande since 1880.212
The most recent binding documents between the two nations
are the Water Utilization Treaty of 1944,213 and the 1983
Border Environmental Cooperation Agreement, signed at La
Paz.214 The former's purpose was to define the rights of the
two nations to the waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers,
and of the Rio Grande, 215 while the latter was designed to
address environmental problems. 216
(1979). The 1955, 1956, and 1958 agreements were concerned with water econ-
omy questions, while the 1965 and 1964 agreements were concerned with fron-
tier waters. Id.
210. Id. at 643, 644.
211. See generally W.A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WEST-
ERN STATES (1971-1977) 159-162, cited in Robert F. Snow, Platte River: Reser-
vation and Quantification of Federal Reserved Water Rights - Firefighting and
Administrative Purposes Only!, 11 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 411, 414 n.6 (1993).
212. See Barber, supra note 41, at 680-84.
213. 1944 Treaty, supra note 15.
214. La Paz Agreement, supra note 15.
215. Barber, supra note 41, at 683.
216. Id. at 686.
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However, the Water Utilization Treaty did not eliminate
all conflict. Drainage, salinity, and priority-use problems
have developed from excessive American and Mexican depen-
dency on the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers. 217 In the past,
American irrigation increased the salinity of water reaching
Mexico from the Colorado River, rendering it virtually
unusable.218 The United States conceded that Mexico's right
to water under the Water Utilization Treaty implied usable
water, but this concession was made only after the applica-
tion of political pressure.219 The International Boundary and
Water Commission (IBWC), which had jurisdictional author-
ity over the dispute under the Water Utilization Treaty, re-
solved the salinity dispute. 220 Under international law,
decisions of commissions empowered by treaty are binding
when ratified by the signatory nations. 221 The IBWC, as the
empowered agency, recorded the resolution of the salinity
dispute in Minute No. 242,222 ruling that "any new develop-
ments of either surface or groundwater resources" by one na-
tion in the border region must be communicated to the
other.223
Since decisions of the ICJ are deemed acceptable by the
world community as rules of customary international law, the
principle of notice established in Minute No. 242 binds both
the United States and Mexico. 224 By combining this new
duty to inform with the rule of mutual state protection, an
217. The 1944 Treaty was an attempt to try to solve the river disputes. See
Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 22, at 224-25.
218. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 172, at 1386.
219. Id.
220. Barber, supra note 41, at 683.
221. Id. See also LORD McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 493 (1961), reprinted
in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 172, at 463-64 (discussing Pacta Sunt Servanda
and Good Faith (Article 26)).
222. Minute No. 242, supra note 15. Decisions made by the IBWC which
involve the "utilization of the international waters" are known as "Minutes."
These Minutes are binding on the disputing nations "unless one of the govern-
ments objects within thirty days." Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 22, at 225.
223. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 22, at 225.
224. See id. at 225 & n.229.
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international environmental principle was established.225
Thus, if water used by both the United States and Mexico
were discovered to have adverse and injurious effects upon
either country, the nation causing the harm would have the
duty to inform the other. 226
The Rio Declaration also creates legal duties surround-
ing transboundary aquifers by incorporating Principle 21, in
which nations are obligated "to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the envi-
ronment of other States .... "227 Since the United States and
Mexico have jurisdiction over all geographic entities within
their territories, the shared underground aquifers spanning
the border fall under both nations' jurisdictions. Therefore,
according to Rio Declaration principles, the United States
and Mexico are obligated not to cause damage to each other's
territory.
In 1983 another bilateral agreement concerning water is-
sues was formed, drawing its substance from the Water Utili-
zation Treaty. This was the United States-Mexico
Agreement for Cooperation on Environmental Programs and
Transboundary Problems.228 Later, in 1992, two more agree-
ments affecting the state of pollution cooperation between the
United States and Mexico were formed. These two agree-
ments are the topic of the next two sections.
A. The Integrated Environmental Border Plan
The first and most important of these agreements was
the Integrated Environmental Border Plan (IEBP).229 The
IEBP sprang from a joint commitment to clean up border pol-
lution on the part of the United States and Mexico. 230 The
225. See Trail Smelter Case, supra note 171 (stating the principle of duty to
inform); Corfu Channel Case, supra note 53 (stating the principle of mutual
state protection).
226. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 172, at 1383 (discussing the Chernobyl Nu-
clear Plant explosion, and noting that the Soviet Union failed to disclose ad-
verse effects of the accident until long afterwards).
227. Rio, supra note 196.
228. La Paz Agreement, supra note 15.
229. IEBP, supra note 15.
230. Id. at I-1.
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IEBP was signed into effect in February 1992,231 and expired
on December 31, 1994.232 The IEBP created four common
goals to combat pollution at the border area.233 To accom-
plish these goals, a Cooperative Enforcement Strategy Group
was created from representatives of both SEDESOL and the
EPA.23 4 At the start of the plan, about $1 billion was
pledged, 23 5 with United States sources donating $379 million,
Mexico granting $466 million, and private industries from
both countries absorbing the remaining costs. 23 6 These funds
were to be targeted at specific problem areas, including sew-
age and wastewater treatment, solid waste disposal, infras-
tructural improvements, and pollution controls.
23 7
Furthermore, the IEBP provided for technical and informa-
tional exchanges to aid in the cleanup.238
Despite the IEBP's establishment of these common goals,
many commentators criticize its effectiveness. First, some
commentators believe that the promised financial backing of
the IEBP fell short of what was necessary to clean up pollu-
tion at the border.239 Second, the jurisdictional capacity of
the administrative agency implementing the IEBP, the Coop-
erative Enforcement Strategy Group, was extremely limited.
Third, the IEBP was not a binding document on either the
United States or Mexico. 240 Finally, the IEBP does nothing
to reconcile previous environmental obligations between the
two nations. 241
231. James P. Duffy III, The Environmental Implications of a North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 561 (1993).
232. See IEBP, supra note 15.
233. EPA SuMMARY, supra note 11, at 20.
234. Id. at 21.
235. President Announces Three-Year Program to Clean Up, Prevent Pollu-
tion at Mexican Border, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 44, 2427 (Feb. 28, 1992) [here-
inafter Three-Year Program].
236. Id.
237. EPA SUMMARY, supra note 11, at 32.
238. Id. at 21.
239. Three-Year Program, supra note 235, at 2427 (quoting Justin Ward, a
resource specialist with the Natural Resources Defense Council as saying, "I've
seen estimates of $5 [billion] to $9 billion for full-blown efforts. I know they can
do better.").
240. See Khakee, supra note 21, at 874 & nn. 195, 196.
241. Id.
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B. The NAFTA Environmental Side Accord
Another recent essential document related to the border
region is the NAFTA Environmental Side Accord. 242 The
NAFTA Environmental Side Accord is distinguished from
other trade agreement accords because it acknowledges the
link between environmental harm and international trade.24a
The NAFTA Environmental Side Accord echoes the theory of
the IEBP by expounding joint environmental principles upon
which the United States and Mexico can agree.244 While the
IEBP falls short jurisdictionally, the NAFTA Environmental
Side Accord remains a binding international document. 245 In
the event of a violation of a specific environmental joint regu-
lation, the NAFTA Environmental Side Accord could be used
to enforce penalties. 246 Nevertheless, like its counterpart,
the Accord fails to establish a specific plan for enforcement or
cleanup of the border region.247 Instead of promulgating
trade sanctions for violations of environmental permits, the
Accord merely states that environmental rules should be
followed.248
Since 1994, international responsibility for environmen-
tal cleanup of the border region has further deteriorated. The
IEBP expired in December 1994, leaving the NAFTA Envi-
ronmental Side Accord as the only remaining document that
addresses the environmental state of the border. Two agen-
cies, the North American Development Bank (NADBANK)
and The Border Environmental Cooperation Commission
(BECC) have continued to monitor the situation at the
border. 249
242. NAFTA Side Accord, supra note 18, at art. 1.
243. Id. at art. 2.
244. Id.
245. Id. at Preamble.
246. NAFTA Side Accord, supra note 18, at art. 5.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. For further discussion on the NADBANK and the BECC, see supra text
accompanying note 19.
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VI. Current Pollution and Enforcement Problems at
the Border
A. Current Pollution Problems
The border between the United States and Mexico ex-
tends from the Pacific Ocean to the Gulf of Mexico, covering a
distance of nearly 2,000 miles. 250 In the past twenty years,
the border has experienced a great influx of industrial and
agricultural users, coupled with an unprecedented number of
immigrants, 251 all of whom need water. According to the
1992 Review of U.S.-Mexico Environmental Issues, the bor-
der population grew from 3.3 million in 1980 to almost 4.7
million in 1990.252 Another source estimates that the popula-
tion increased to six million between 1980 and 1990.253 Pro-
jections predict a future annual growth rate of three percent,
to create a total border population of ten million by 2003.254
This influx will constitute a further burden on an over-
whelmed "environmental infrastructure capacity."25 5 Border
cities, which "rely principally on groundwater," are in in-
creasing competition for available water.256 Moreover, sew-
age disposal systems and waste disposal facilities are
inadequate to handle the flood of people and businesses. 257
Environmental degradation is so severe that the stretch
of the Rio Grande running through downtown Nuevo Laredo,
Mexico, carries 1,000 times the fecal contamination level al-
lowed by Texas law.258 Moreover, ninety percent "of adults
250. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
REVIEW OF U.S.-MEXIco ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, ExEcUTIVE SuMMARY 106
(1992) [hereinafter REVIEW].
251. KISS & SHELTON, supra note 22, at 223.
252. REVIEW, supra note 250, at 106.
253. Khakee, supra note 21, at 854.
254. Report Presents Environmental Challenges Along U.S./ Mexico Border:
A Greener Frontier, BUSINESS MEXICO, May 1994, available in LEXIS, World
Library.
255. Id.
256. McCaffrey, supra note 26, at 229.
257. Michael S. Feeley & Elizabeth Knier, Environmental Considerations of
the Emerging United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, 2 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 259, 272 (1992).
258. Id. at 273. See James Garcia, Border River Laden With Wastes, AUSTIN
AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 29, 1991, at Al.
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thirty-five years or older in the shanty towns near San
Elizario, Mexico, contract Hepatitis sometime during their
lifetime,"25 9 and the level of Hepatitis found at the border of
Arizona is twenty times the American average. 260 Arizona
declared a public health emergency in 1992 as a result of un-
treated wastewater and toxic industrial pollution in the
Nogales Wash.261 Similarly, the New River carries over one
hundred industrial chemicals and "every disease known in
the western hemisphere" from Mexico into California.262 Ac-
cording to studies done by the Arizona Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality, industrial solvents and hazardous
organic compounds were found to exist in groundwater. 263 In
addition, raw sewage and industrial contaminants also flow
from both Texas and Mexico into the Rio Grande.264 The
worst of the pollution in the border region has been caused by
the flow of untreated sewage into the rivers because of the
lack of treatment facilities in the region. 265 Nevertheless, the
pollution remains unchecked, in part because of the United
States' decision to leave the problem to the IBWC, and be-
cause of "loopholes" in Mexican regulations. 266
Several types of pollution affecting groundwater have
contributed to the aforementioned health problems, including
hazardous waste, pesticides, and sewage. Hazardous waste
is a particularly troublesome pollution problem for border aq-
uifers, in part because of Mexico's maquiladora program. 267
259. Feeley & Knier, supra note 257, at 273.
260. Id. at 273 n.100. See Robert Suro, Border Boom's Dirty Residue Imper-
ils U.S.-Mexico Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1991, at Al.
261. Feeley & Knier, supra note 257, at 273.
262. Id. at 275, n.114 (quoting Jane Kay, The "Toxic Dump" that Flows into
California, S.F. EXAMINER, June 22, 1986, at 7).
263. Transboundary Pollution, supra note 2, at 307.
264. Brenda S. Hustis, The Environmental Implications of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement, 28 TEx. INT'L L.J. 589, 597-600 (1993).
265. Id. at 597.
266. Transboundary Pollution, supra note 2, at 307.
267. 'A maquiladora is a manufacturing operation that temporarily imports,
duty free or under bond, capital goods... [and] inputs," and produces finished
goods for export. A Case Study of Internationalization, BUSINESS MEXIco, Janu-
ary/February 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mags File. The maqui-
ladora industry developed out of the International Agreement of Migratory
Workers of 1942 between the United States and Mexico, the Bracero Program.
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Sixty-eight percent of the maquiladoras produce electronics,
transportation equipment, petroleum-based products, or met-
als, all of which emit toxic chemicals into the air, water, or
land.268 By 1992 approximately 1,963 maquiladoras oper-
ated at the border,269 of which only 307 obtained permits to
pollute.270 Furthermore, while fifty-two percent of the ma-
quiladoras generated hazardous waste, only nineteen percent
have been documented as either recycling their waste or re-
turning their waste to the country of origin.271
Illegal dumping of hazardous waste and misuse of haz-
ardous waste in Mexico, while not well documented, has been
called "obvious," and has shown up in groundwater tests.272
Id. Under the Bracero Program, Mexican workers, mostly the rural poor, tem-
porarily entered the United States to increase American agriculture production.
Id. The American government unilaterally terminated the Program in the
early 1960's under pressure from American labor. Id. In its place, the Mexican
government instituted the 1965 Border Industrialization Program to spur job
creation and foreign investment. A Case Study of Internationalization, Busi-
NESS MEXIco, January/February 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mags
File. The maquiladora industry blossomed in the 1980's, growing from 539 to
1,834 facilities by early 1990. Id. In 1994, 2,155 maquiladoras operated in
Mexico, employing 544,500 people. Id. The Mexican maquiladora program is
now one of the world's largest. Id.
Maquiladoras may be completely foreign-owned, and employ foreign man-
agers and technicians. A Case Study of Internationalization, BusiNEss MEXIco,
January/February 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mags File. Origi-
nally restricted to a 20 kilometer strip following the border, maquiladoras now
may locate anywhere within Mexico. Id. Mexico requires that only 33 percent
of the finished products the maquiladoras produce be sold in the Mexican mar-
ket, while the rest must be exported. Id. American customs laws also provide
favorable tax treatment, taxing only the value of labor and material added in
Mexico to American materials or components. Id. In 1992, the maquiladora
industry contributed $4.74 billion in added value to imported American mate-
rial. A Case Study of Internationalization, BusINEss MExico, January/Febru-
ary 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mags File.
268. See EPA SUMMARY, supra note 11, at 8.
269. Malissa H. McKeith, Analysis and Perspective: Environmental Provi-
sions Affecting Businesses on the U.S. /Mexico Border, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA),
No. 8, 245, 246 (Apr. 22, 1992).
270. Id.
271. Hustis, supra note 257, at 601, citing Mary E. Kelly et al., U.S.-Mexico
Free Trade Negotiations and the Environment, Exploring the Issues, 26 COLUM.
J. WORLD Bus. 42, 52 (1991). Under Mexican law, hazardous waste which can-
not be "nationalized or recycled into usable products" must return to the coun-
try of origin for disposal. Id. at 600 (quoting Kelly, supra).
272. Transboundary Pollution, supra note 2, at 307.
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Examples of such improper disposal are startling. In the
mid-1980's, scrap metal containing radioactive cobalt-60 from
a hospital x-ray machine was sold to a furniture manufac-
turer instead of being treated and buried.273 This manufac-
turer incorporated the metal into tables and chairs which
were later distributed in the American home furnishings
market.274 Perhaps most shocking is the 1993 incident in
Juarez, Mexico, where a ten-year-old girl suffered chemical
burns after stepping into a pool of unidentified, toxic, indus-
trial solvent that had leaked from Presto Lock, an American-
owned padlock factory.27 5 The incident prompted a ground-
water study by the city environmental officer of Juarez, who
discovered "incredibly high levels of cyanide and chromium"
in the city drainage system.27 6 Unfortunately, the Mexican
jurisdictional framework precluded city officials from enact-
ing swift sanctions against Presto Lock because only the fed-
eral government held the power to sanction polluters. 277
Although the city imposed sanctions on Presto Lock once the
pollutants entered the city drainage system,278 a potable
drinking source had already been contaminated. 27 9 Clearly,
such shocking incidents exemplify the critical need to prevent
mismanaged dumping of hazardous waste into waterways
and underground aquifers.
Pesticides are an additional problematic source of ground
water pollution, in part because major agricultural busi-
273. Todd Robberson, Mexicans Rage over Pollution; Injury of 10-year-old
Draws Out Protestors, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1993, at A10.
274. Id. Although most of the furniture has been retrieved, some of it re-
mains unrecovered. Id.
275. Id.
276. Todd Robberson, Mexicans Rage over Pollution; Injury of 10-year-old
Draws Out Protestors, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1993, at A10. (quoting Francisco
Nunez, the Juarez environmental officer). The Juarez study produced results
similar to those of a 1985 EPA investigation of Presto Lock's plant in Garfield,
New Jersey, which resulted in a $30,000 fine on Presto Lock for illegal dumping
of heavy metals and cyanide. Id.
277. Robberson, supra note 273, at A-10.
278. Id. "Because federal law gave the city sole jurisdiction over its drainage
system, Juarez could sanction Presto Lock for dumping solvents once they en-
tered city sewers." Id.
279. Id.
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nesses also operate on the border. Mexican pesticide regula-
tions are less stringent than American regulations.280 In
fact, the Mexican government argues that Mexico should not
be expected to abide by the rigorous environmental regula-
tions set by the United States because Mexico is unable to
afford the same standards.281 Unfortunately, in the United
States, pesticides used in agriculture fall into the category of
"non-point source" pollutants, 282 which are not as stringently
regulated as point source pollutants such as those emanating
from pipes, ditches, and channels.288 While many states have
groundwater quality statutes that specifically regulate the ef-
fects of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals on
groundwater, 28 4 these statutes vary in stringency from state
to state, 28 5 and are often ineffective at stemming ground-
water contamination from agricultural applications.
28 6
These same problems exist in Mexico along the border
region.28 7
Sewage effluent is a third major pollutant at the border
area. This problem is accentuated by the heavy financial bur-
dens on the infrastructure of the borderlands and the lenient
Mexican environmental enforcement standards, 28 8 resulting
in inadequate measures to treat raw sewage. 28 9 For example,
the Tijuana River, which flows north to the United States (as
280. Feeley & Knier, supra note 257, at 269. Likewise, United States pesti-
cide regulations are less stringent than those of Canada. Id. at 270. The
United States oversees pesticide use under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988), and controls point
source pesticide use under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
281. Feeley & Knier, supra note 257, at 268.
282. SIERRA CLUB LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, THE POISONED WELL 283 (Eric P.
Jorgensen ed., 1989).
283. See CWA §§ 502(14), 402, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(14), 1342; Miller & Long,
supra note 49, at v. I, ch. III, 62, 63.
284. MORANDI, supra note 43, at 34-36.
285. Id. at 16-17, 34-36.
286. SIERRA CLUB LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 282, at 278. "EPA has
documented groundwater contamination in 23 states by 17 pesticides from nor-
mal agricultural use, with an Iowa study showing low pesticide concentrations
in 70 to 80 percent of wells sampled." Id.
287. Feeley & Knier, supra note 257, at 266, 267.
288. Id. at 268.
289. Id. at 272.
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does the underground aquifer which accompanies it), has be-
come a dumping place for raw sewage. 290 At times, sewage
and sewage waste from the Tijuana River have been used to
irrigate agricultural fields. 291 Like pesticide run-off, this un-
treated irrigation poses grave risks to groundwater purity.292
The Mexican and American governments have made
some efforts to address these pollution concerns. In 1992,
Mexico allocated $460 million for environmental improve-
ment, and the United States earmarked $379 million, $125
million of which was to be spent creating sewage treatment
plants at the border.293 Moreover, in 1992 the IBWC created
the IEBP as an administrative framework through which to
accomplish environmental objectives at the border. 294 Con-
cerned about health standards, the joint commission estab-
lished several goals to address these pollution concerns.
These goals included monitoring groundwater and creating
an inventory of the sources of, and the treatment processes
for, drinking water along the border.295 The Commission also
cited the underground aquifers of the Rio Grande and the
Colorado River as suffering adverse effects from increased in-
dustrial growth and residential development along the bor-
der.296 However, the IBWC, the administrative agency
charged by the IEBP to gather groundwater quality data,
missed the deadline for a data report and failed to deliver any
conclusions. 297 In addition, the IEBP does not address how
enforcement actions should proceed, instead leaving that is-
sue for the individual countries to address. 298
290. Hustis, supra note 271, at 598.
291. Id.
292. See id.
293. David C. Scott, U.S., Mexico Launch Border Cleanup, CHRISTIAN SCI-
ENCE MONITOR, Feb. 28, 1992, at 6.
294. See LEBP, supra note 15; Barber, supra note 41, at 642.
295. IEBP, supra note 15.
296. Id.
297. IEBP, supra note 15; Barber, supra note 41, at 648-49.
298. Barber, supra note 41, at 648-50.
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B. Current Enforcement Problems
Because several different authorities regulate ground-
water at the border, using various laws, enforcement of pollu-
tion standards is extremely complex and difficult.299 Not only
do Mexico and the United States address groundwater
through federal laws and regulations, 300 but the states of Cal-
ifornia, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas in America, and
Chihuahua, Baja California Norte, and Tamaulipas in Mex-
ico, also create regulatory measures and enforcement proce-
dures regarding water pollution,301 as do local city
agencies. 30 2 Moreover, several international commissions
have adopted articles mentioning anti-pollution measures for
groundwater.30 3 Yet all these legal attempts to protect
groundwater have been incapable of providing strong enforce-
ment or a procedural mechanism by which to punish and de-
ter polluters.30 4
Discrepancies in legal groundwater regulation create two
major enforcement problems. First, under GLEEEP,
SEDESOL has the power to order cleanups, close facilities,
and confiscate hazardous materials.30 5 By 1991, SEDUE had
closed over seventy companies which were polluting air and
water resources.30 6 The Mexican government has also in-
creased the number of environmental patrols along the bor-
der areas.307 Nevertheless, these efforts simply remain
insufficient to identify all violators.
Second, although transboundary pollution is an acknowl-
edged international issue, to date there exists no comprehen-
299. See supra discussion at Part III.A.
300. See supra discussion at Parts IIIA. and B.
301. See supra discussion at Parts III.A.2. and B.
302. BNA Reporter: 247:0101 § 113 at 171 (1992).
303. See supra discussion at Part VI (analyzing the 1944 Treaty between the
United States and Mexico, the International Law Commission on Non-Naviga-
tional Uses of Watercourses, and the IEBP).
304. Khakee, supra note 21, at 865-66, 874-75.
305. McKeith, supra note 269, at 246-47.
306. Id. at 247.
307. See Secretary Warren G. Christopher, U.S.-Mexican Relations and
NAFTA: The Opportunity of a Generation, Address Before the U.S.-Mexico
Binational Commission (June 21, 1993), in U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, June 28,
1993.
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sive international transboundary aquifer policy.30 8 The
current international treaties addressing groundwater pollu-
tion fail to provide a clear mechanism for enforcement of pen-
alties or for injunctive relief 3 0 9 Most international treaties
revolve around the concept of state action, under which ac-
tions of nations are legal unless they violate specific interna-
tional treaty provisions to which the nations involved have
agreed.3 10 Currently, the International Legal Commission
(ILC) regards water issues under the "no-harm" rule,3 1'
which has been criticized for not specifying whether a "strict
liability" or a "due diligence" standard will apply when ana-
lyzing violations of water regulation.3 12
VII. Possible Solutions
In 1989, after over ten years of discussion and revision by
several transboundary resource scholars, the IBWC created
and proposed the Bellagio Draft Treaty as a possible solution
to the pollution problem at the border. 313 The Bellagio Draft
Treaty proposed a division of groundwater into zones where
groundwater has reached critical levels of depletion or pollu-
tion.3 14 Pollution violations occurring within these zones
would be governed by either American or Mexican national
water law, with oversight by an international agency like the
IBWC.3 15 Any regulations to which the IBWC or any other
appropriate joint commission agreed would preempt national
water law.31 6
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311. McCaffrey, supra note 26, at 230. The ILC is an international body that
the IBWC called upon to draft principles of law for international watercourses.
Id. at 229. The "no-harm" rule is an obligation set forth by the ILC that a state
must not cause appreciable harm to another state through its use of an interna-
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313. Transboundary Groundwaters, supra note 23, at 665-66.
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Unfortunately, the terms of the Bellagio Draft Treaty
present potential conflicts, since groundwater protection is
such a new and unresolved area of law. For example, the
question of a liability standard remains unexplored in the
treaty.317 Currently, environmental law under the IBWC
conforms to traditional American tort analysis,318 which may
or may not be incorporated into the treaty. Moreover, Mexico
and the United States could adhere to either a strict liability
standard or a negligence standard if groundwater is pol-
luted.3 19 Should the United States and Mexico not agree on a
standard of liability, disputes could arise.
The United States and Mexico may well look to the
IBWC or the ICJ to resolve any dispute that does arise under
the treaty. The court may rely on jus cogens in order to re-
solve the dispute.3 20 Alternatively, the ICJ may look to sev-
eral multilateral declarations which announce a commitment
to the preservation and protection of the environment to fash-
ion a remedy for potential pollution conflicts between Mexico
and the United States.3 21
The court also has another option. As articulated in the
Paquete Habana case,3 22 when no international precedent is
available upon which the court may rely, the court may look
to the domestic laws of the disputing states.3 23 Although the
domestic water laws of both Mexico and the United States are
in a continual state of regulatory flux, the court may choose to
employ the United States CWA section 310(a)3 24 option, thus
elevating the concepts of "endangerment finding" and a "reci-
procity finding" to the international level.3 25 However, since
the United States itself has yet to rely on section 310(a) of the
CWA, the use of this section would be a great leap for the ICJ.
Even if the ICJ did apply the principles of endangerment and
317. See McCaffrey, supra note 26, at 231.
318. Developments in the Law, supra note 185, at 1494.
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324. CWA § 310(a), 33 U.S.C § 1320(a).
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reciprocity findings, both the United States and Mexico may
escape future liability for groundwater pollution by simply re-
fusing to attend the proceedings. 326 Consequently, at a mini-
mum, the Bellagio Draft Treaty must be revised to include a
specific liability standard and ensure binding responsibility
on the states.
VIII. Conclusion
Further commercial and industrial development of the
borderlands, and the pollution that comes with it, is inevita-
ble. Moreover, the border population will continue to rely on
groundwater as the source of most of its water. Unfortu-
nately, Mexico lacks the infrastructural ability to curtail and
enforce pollution abatement measures. In addition, without
a treaty, the United States bears no specific obligation to re-
duce the threat of pollution. With the expiration of the Inter-
national Environmental Border Plan in 1994, the recent
passage of NAFTA, and the incredible industrial and popula-
tion explosion at the borderlands, a system of bilateral coop-
eration between Mexico and the United States addressing
groundwater protection at the borderlands is essential. The
only way to ensure that the threat of groundwater pollution
and depletion at the border is properly addressed would be
for the United States and Mexico to pass a binding ground-
water nation-state agreement.
326. See Nuclear Test Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99 (Judgment of June
22) (where France escaped liability for transboundary pollution by refusing to
submit to ICJ jurisdiction).
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